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Abstract: The unprecedented development of production networks in East Asia has been investigated, 
both theoretically and empirically, employing the conceptual framework of fragmentation theory and its 
extensions. However, the benefits of production fragmentation at the firm level, particularly benefits 
deriving from different location advantages, have never been directly measured empirically. This paper 
presents the very first attempt, to the authors’ knowledge, to empirically capture the benefits of 
fragmentation. Specifically, using Japanese firm-level data, we find that the larger the gap in the 
capital-labor ratios between fragmenting firms’ home and overseas activities, the more greatly their cost 
efficiency improves. 
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 11. Introduction 
The fragmentation theory initiated by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) has had a 
great impact on the theoretical conceptualization of the production-process-wise 
division of labor developed between the North and South.
1 Notably, the unprecedented 
formation of production networks in East Asia has been investigated, both theoretically 
and empirically, with employing the conceptual framework of fragmentation theory and 
its extensions.
2 The fragmentation theory has indeed become a strong theoretical 
backbone for understanding the recent phenomenon of active North-South intra-industry 
trade. Applying gravity equations for bilateral trade data at the industrial level, some 
researchers have found more active trade in parts and components in country-pairs with 
larger differences in income in East Asia (see, for example, Athukorala and Yamashita, 
2006; Kimura, Takahashi, and Hayakawa, 2007). However, the benefits of production 
fragmentation  at the firm level, particularly benefits derived from utilizing different 
location advantages, have never been directly measured empirically. This short paper 
presents the very first attempt, to the authors’ knowledge, to empirically capture the 
benefits of fragmentation, using rigorous econometric methods. 
The basic concept of fragmentation is illustrated as Figure 1. Suppose that a firm 
originally has a large electronics factory that takes care of a long sequence of value 
chains from upstream to downstream. The electronics industry as a whole is 
physical-capital-intensive or human-capital-intensive, so that the factory is located in a 
developed country. If we take a look at the factory in details, we find that it consists of 
various production processes; some production processes are purely 
human-capital-intensive while others are labor-intensive. Thus, if the firm properly 
divides a factory into multiple production blocks and places them in various locations 
with different location advantages, the total production cost may be reduced. This is 
fragmentation. To make fragmentation economically viable, two conditions must be met. 
First, there must be a large reduction in production cost in production blocks, achieved 
by utilizing different location advantages. Secondly, the cost of the service links that 
connect remotely located production blocks must be reasonably low. 
 
===  Figure  1  === 
                                                  
1 For the fragmentation theory and its applications, also see Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), Cheng 
and Kierzkowski (2001), and articles in the special issue of International Review of Economic and 
Finance on “Outsourcing and Fragmentation: Blessing or Threat” (Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2005). 
2 Kimura and Ando (2005) extend the fragmentation framework to two dimensions, incorporating 
fragmentation along the geographical distance axis and along the integration (intra-firm vs. arm’s 
length) axis. Kimura (2006) summarizes the nature and characteristics of East Asian production 
networks in the extended framework. 
 2 
Note that the fragmentation theory does not directly include the mechanism by 
which the production blocks are separated. Suppose that production activities require 
two primary inputs, capital (K) and labor (L), and differences in location advantages 
between developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs) are 
represented by differences in factor prices, r and w. If a firm could freely separate 
production blocks, it would place a purely capital-using production block in a DC and a 
purely labor-using production block in a LDC, in order to fully exploit differences in 
factor prices. This, however, does not actually happen because a firm faces 
technological and managerial constraints in separating production blocks. Casual 
observations in a number of factory visits suggest that production blocks located in 
LDCs tend to be more labor-intensive than those in DCs, as we would expect. However, 
gaps in factor intensity between production blocks in LDCs and DCs differ widely 
across firms, and how far the differences in location advantages are exploited seems to 
determine the extent of gains from fragmentation. 
This is actually a testable hypothesis with the data of Japanese firms and their 
foreign affiliates, though we have to tolerate various data limitations. What we will 
demonstrate is as follows: suppose that two firms initially exist in an industry and 
operate at home (a DC) with the same technology. They now draw lotteries as Melitz 
(2003), determine the magnitude of gaps in factor intensity between a production block 
which remains at home and the other located in a foreign country (a LDC), and conduct 
fragmentation. Applying a set of reasonable conditions proposed by Deardorff (2001), 
we graphically demonstrate that a firm with a larger gap in factor intensity in 
fragmentation presents better performance than the other. Our econometric exercise 
provides a robust support for this claim. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section provides the 
theoretical framework of our empirical analysis. Following the theoretical framework of 
Deardorff (2001), we show that international fragmentation with a larger gap in 
capital-labor ratios (KL ratios) between two production blocks leads to a larger total 
cost reduction. Section 3 specifies our empirical methodology and discusses data issues. 
Some data overview on the capital-labor ratios of Japanese MNEs and the empirical 
results are reported in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
          This section summarizes how the benefit from fragmentation is related to the gap 
 3in capital-labor ratios between activities at home and abroad. To do that, we employ the 
fragmentation model, particularly the theoretical framework proposed by Deardorff 
(2001). 
 
2.1. Fragmentation and the Gap in KL Ratios 
Consider two countries with different factor prices under free trade. The one is the 
capital-abundant North, and the other is the labor-abundant South. We assume that 
sufficiently different factor endowments between countries make factor price 
equalization impossible. Unit isocost lines in both countries are shown in Figure 2 (lines 
ACD and BCE for South and North, respectively). In this paper, we focus on good X, 
which is assumed to be capital-intensive enough to be initially produced only in the 
North. In this framework, we consider the total cost of a firm that tries to fragment 
technology for producing X. The production of good X can be broken up into two 
fragments, which are assumed to follow Leontief fixed-coefficient technologies. It is 
also assumed that since the firm  constitutes a sufficiently small part of the total 
economies, it takes factor prices in the two countries as given, and its changing to the 
fragmented technology does not cause a noticeable change in the factor prices in either 
country. 
 
===  Figure  2  === 
 
We first consider the fragmentation that uses the same quantity of resources as the 
unfragmented technology. Deardorff (2001) calls such fragmentation “costless 
fragmentation”. The amount of good X produced by the isoquant X=1/px can also be 
produced using the capital-intensive fragment that requires the vector of factors shown 
as OZ and the labor-intensive fragment that requires the vector shown as ZY. Since the 
capital-labor ratio of fragment OZ is above the cutoff line OC, the capital-intensive 
fragment OZ will be produced in the North.   
In this setting, Deardorff (2001) demonstrates that international fragmentation 
leads to total cost reduction. To see this, it is useful to draw some lines. The lines 
A’C’D’ and B’C’E’ are parallel to ACD and BCE respectively, and both lines are 
contracted toward the origin by the same proportion. The line B’C’E’ passes through the 
tip of the arrow OZ and thus shows the factor combinations that cost as much as factor 
inputs in producing fragment OZ in the North. The amount of such cost becomes less 
than one dollar. Since point C’ is placed on both A’C’D’ and B’C’E’, the factor 
combination at this point costs the same amount between the North and the South. Thus, 
 4drawing vector C’Y’ with the same length and direction as ZY, we can obtain the point 
Y’, through which an isocost line shows the total cost for producing the 
capital-intensive fragment in the North and the labor-intensive fragment in the South. 
As a result, since the point Y’ lies inside unit isocost line ACD, the use of fragmented 
technology reduces the cost if the fragments are produced in different countries. That is, 
in this setting, international fragmentation succeeds in reducing the total cost for the 
production of good X.
3  
     We can derive a further meaningful result from the above framework. We 
consider two firms. While one firm conducts fragmentation with a large gap in 
capital-labor ratios between fragments (KL gap), the other firm does so with a small KL 
gap. Here we restrict our attention to the fragmentation in which the cost for producing 
the capital-intensive fragment does not depend on its KL ratio. This ensures that the KL 
gap uniformly expands as the KL ratio in the capital-intensive fragment rises. Thus, we 
can easily compare fragmentation between large and small KL gaps. Graphically, even 
if the KL ratio in capital-intensive fragment OZ changes, the tip of the arrow OZ is 
always placed on the line B’E’.
4  
     The result is shown in Figure 3. Two fragments’ vectors in the large KL gap 
fragmentation are shown as OZ and ZY, and those in the small KL gap fragmentation as 
OZ’ and Z’Y. Notice that both points Z and Z’ are placed on the line E’B’ since the cost 
of producing the fragment does not depend on its KL ratio. The rest of the figure 
construction is the same as in Figure 1. Corresponding vectors to ZY and Z’Y are C’Y’ 
and C’Y’’, respectively. Because both vectors C’Y’ and C’Y’’ start from point C’, and 
due to the order of KL ratio between ZY and Z’Y, point Y’’ always lies more inside the 
isocost line ACD than point Y’. This indicates that a large KL gap fragmentation leads 
to more total cost reduction than a small gap fragmentation.   
 
===   Figure  3   === 
 
 
2.2. Service Link Costs 
     So far, we have not considered costs to link two remotely located fragments, i.e. 
                                                  
3 If the fragment ZY is not so labor-intensive, that is, if Y’ is placed on the upper-left area of the 
point C, international fragmentation raises the total cost. In this paper, we assume that the fragment 
ZY is sufficiently labor-intensive. At the same time, the fragment OZ is assumed to be sufficiently 
capital-intensive that the good X is capital-intensive enough to be produced only in the North in the 
unfragmented technology. 
4 Since allowing the dependence of the cost in the capital-intensive fragment on its KL ratio 
prevents us from visualizing our claim, we do not cover such fragmentation in this paper. 
 5service link costs. A service link would require additional supervision, coordination, and 
control over the geographically diversified production activities. In this subsection, we 
model such costs as additional factor use. As a result, international fragmentation is 
required to use more combined factors than could have produced the good before. 
Specifically, we assume that such extra resources have the same KL ratio with the 
fragment at home and are inputted at home by a certain proportion of resources used in 
the home fragment.
5 This type of fragmentation is qualitatively similar to the one that 
Deardorff (2001) calls “costly fragmentation”.   
In this framework, as in Deardorff (2001), we can see that international “costly” 
fragmentation could still lead to a total cost reduction. Such a case is shown in Figure 4. 
Since the capital-intensive fragment extends beyond the previous isocost line B’C’E’, 
the labor-intensive fragment’s vector also reaches beyond the unit-isocost line BCE. As 
a result, the same figure construction as before yields the point Y’, through which an 
isocost line shows the total cost in international fragmentation. Thus, international 
fragmentation can reduce the total cost even though it is costly in terms of factor use. 
Consequently, as the fragmentation theory claims (see, for example, Arndt and 
Kierzkowski, 2001; Cheng and Kierzkowski, 2001), whether international 
fragmentation reduces total cost or not depends on the magnitude of service link costs 
(in our case, the amount of the extra resources). The longer the vector OZ, the more 
likely it is that point Y’ will reach the right area of unit-isocost line ACD. Thus, the 
smaller the service link cost, the larger total cost reduction the firms can enjoy. 
 
===   Figure  4   === 
 
          We again compare fragmentation between large and small KL gaps, incorporating 
service link costs. As shown in Figure 5, the figure construction is basically the same as 
in Figure 3. We extend the fragment OZ’ by the same proportion as in the case of 
fragment OZ. Since we restrict ourselves to the fragmentation in which the cost for 
producing the capital-intensive fragment does not depend on its KL ratio, the vectors 
C’’Y’ and C’’Y’’ again start from the same point. Thus, we can confirm that a large KL 
gap fragmentation leads to more total cost reduction than a small gap fragmentation. 
Consequently, in this section, we obtain the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Testable Hypothesis: The larger the gap in KL ratios between a Northern fragment and 
                                                  
5 The following results are qualitatively unchanged even if we assume such extra resources are 
inputted abroad (see Deardorff, 2001), or both at home and abroad. 
 6a Southern fragment, the greater the total cost reduction in international fragmentation. 
 
In other words, the larger the gap in KL ratios between an MNE’s home and overseas 
activities, the larger its total profit is. As long as we assume Leontief technology, the 
MNE’s profit has a positive linear relationship with the gap in KL ratios. From the next 
section, we investigate whether this hypothesis is empirically valid or not. 
 
===   Figure  5   === 
 
 
3. Empirical Issues 
 
3.1. Methodology 
     Our hypothesis to be tested is whether the larger the gap in KL ratios between a 
fragmentation firm’s home and overseas activities, the better the performance of the 
firm is. To empirically test this hypothesis, we regress the following simple linear 
equation: 
 
Performanceft = β0 + β1 Gapft + uft,  






β0 and β1 are coefficients to be estimated, and β1 is expected to be significantly positive. 
u is disturbance. Gap is the difference in capital-labor ratios between home and abroad.
6 
K and L are tangible fixed assets and labor, respectively. Subscripts f and t represent 
firm and year, respectively. We do not take logs of Performance and Gap not only 
because they can be negative but also because the theoretical framework does not 
require us to take their logs. To keep consistency of our empirical framework with the 
above theoretical prediction, we investigate MNEs’ profits on a consolidated basis, i.e. 
the sum of home profit and overseas profit.
7 Thus the greater the total cost reduction in 
                                                  
6 In this paper, we use the difference in capital-labor ratios between home and abroad rather than 
their ratio. In the gravity analysis, the relationship between trade and wage gap is often examined 
(see, for example, Kimura, et al., 2007). All these studies use a difference in GDP per capita between 
exporter and importer as the gap measure. Also in the studies of the knowledge-capital model, e.g. 
Carr, et al. (2001), a difference in the share of the labor force in certain skilled occupations between 
parent and host country is used in order to examine the relationship between affiliate sales and skill 
difference. Our paper follows the formulation of gap in such studies. But, even in the case of the 
ratio, we obtain qualitatively the same results, particularly in the case of labor productivity. 
7 To our best knowledge, this paper is the first that explores the impacts of investing abroad on 
investors’ consolidated performance. 
 7international fragmentation, the larger their consolidated profits would be. To control 
differences in scale among MNEs, we divide the consolidated profits by their total 
assets. In addition to the profits, we also examine the impact on value added
8 on a 
consolidated basis, which is further divided by their total employment. Firms with 
greater total cost reduction in international fragmentation would gain larger value added. 
In sum, our performance measures are return on assets (ROA) and labor productivity on 
a consolidated basis.   
     Some other variables are included as independent variables for controlling 
firm-specific characteristics and host country-specific characteristics. The first variable 
is a firm-specific one. The amount of capital stock on a consolidated basis is included to 
further control MNEs’ scale. The other variables are host country-specific ones. In the 
above theoretical framework, we confirm that the smaller the service link cost, the 
larger the benefit from investing. To control differences in the service link cost with 
Japan among host countries, we include two variables on such cost: geographical 
distance between Japan and host country and the extent of country risk. As a result, our 
baseline regression equation is given by 
 
Performanceft = β0 + β1 Gapft + β2 ln Capital Stockft + β3 ln Distancec + β4 ln Riskct + uft. 
 
Subscript c represents host country. Year and industry dummies are also introduced. 
     In order to keep further consistency with the theoretical framework, we need to 
restrict our sample firms only to firms with fragmentation. To do that, we require 
sample firms to meet the following five conditions. The first is to invest in East Asian 
countries since many empirical papers such as Kimura (2006) show that Japan has 
actively been engaged in international fragmentation primarily with East Asian 
countries. Secondly, we restrict to firms with only one affiliate. Although it is an 
important research topic to clarify the mechanics and consequences of operating 
multiple affiliates, such examination is beyond our framework in section 2.
9 The third is 
the firms of which activities at home are more capital-intensive than those abroad. Since 
Japan is expected to serve as a country producing the more capital-intensive fragments 
                                                  
8 Due to the data limitation in this paper, value added is simply defined as total sales minus total 
procurements. 
9 We also conducted regression with the MNEs with multiple affiliates in East Asia. The gap 
measure is constructed by using the weighted average of all East Asian affiliates’ KL ratio in each 
MNE. We use affiliates’ sales as a weight. Their inclusion in the sample drastically increases the 
number of observations in regression, though the aggregation procedure is inevitably accompanied 
by a looser link with our theoretical framework. As a result, we obtained qualitatively unchanged 
results as reported in this paper.   
 8than host countries in East Asia, firms with negative gaps are eliminated from our 
sample. Fourthly, we restrict our sample set to firms that are actually exporting their 
products from home to their overseas affiliates, since the fundamental source of benefits 
from international fragmentation is the intra-firm vertical division of labor between 
home and abroad. As long as we assume that upstream processes are more 
capital-intensive, Japanese MNEs should export their upstream products to their affiliate. 
Lastly, our sample of overseas affiliates is restricted to affiliates in the same industry as 
their parents, which enables us to compare KL ratios among fragments (production 
processes) in an industry, as is consistent with our theoretical framework. 
 
3.2. Data Issues 
Our main data source is “The Basic Survey of Overseas Business and Activities 
(BSOBA),” which is a firm-level survey by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, Government of Japan. The aim of this survey is to obtain basic information on 
the activities of the overseas affiliates of Japanese firms. The survey has two versions. 
One is the Basic Survey, which includes more detailed questions and is conducted every 
three years. The other is the Trend Survey, which is an abbreviated version and is 
carried out between the Basic Surveys. Both the Basic Survey and the Trend Survey 
consist of two parts: one is for parent companies and the other is for their overseas 
affiliates.
10 The parent companies are Japanese corporations which, as of the end of 
March, own or have owned overseas affiliates in the past, excluding those in the 
financial and insurance industry or real estate industry. The information on parents 
includes their employment, assets, exports, and so on. As for affiliates, the 
establishment year of the affiliates, the breakdown of sales and purchases, employment, 
costs, and research and development, and so forth are available. As a result, the BSOBA 
provides us all necessary data on firm-specific variables. 
As of 2008, micro data sets for the BSOBA are available between 1995 and 2005. 
However, tangible fixed assets in parent firms and their overseas affiliates, which are 
necessary to construct the Gap, are available only in the Basic Survey. Furthermore, 
such information turns out to be unavailable for 2004. Thus, our sample years are forced 
to be only 1995, 1998, and 2001. For further information on the figures included in the 
BSOBA, see “Survey Form for Oversea Affiliates” and “Guide for Completing the 
                                                  
10 An overseas affiliate of a Japanese firm is defined as follows: a foreign affiliate in which a 
Japanese firm has the invested capital of 10% or more, a foreign affiliate in which a “subsidiary” 
funded more than 50% by a Japanese firm has invested capital of more than 50%, and a foreign 
affiliate in which a Japanese firm and a subsidiary funded more than 50% by a Japanese firm have 
invested capital of more than 50%. 
 9Survey”.
11 
Next, data sources of the country-specific variables are as follows: the data on 
bilateral distance are drawn from the CEPII website. As a proxy for the country risk, we 
use a country risk index which is drawn from Institutional Investor (Institutional 
Investor, various issues). This index is formed from aggregates of bankers’ evaluations 
on the risk of default, and a larger value indicates that the risk of default in the country 
is smaller. 
Lastly, it is worth noting one crucial limitation in our dataset. Our dataset is 
pooling data, not panel data. Although our data source includes firm identification codes 
applicable over years, most of our sample firms appear only once, mainly due to the 
frequent absence of data on tangible fixed assets. As a result, we are forced to treat our 
sample as a pooling set and could not introduce time-invariant firm-fixed effects into 
our regression equation. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Overview of KL Ratios in Japanese MNEs 
     We present some tables on capital-labor ratios in Japanese MNEs in 1998, in 
which there are a largest number of observations for our sample period, i.e. 1995, 1998, 
and 2001. The number of Japanese overseas affiliates reporting both K and L in 1998 is 
provided by industry by region in Table 1.
12 As for regional definition, in this paper, 
East Asia means ASEAN countries, China, and Asian NIEs, while developed countries 
include European countries (both Western and Eastern European countries) plus North 
American countries (Canada and the US). 
 
===   Table  1   === 
 
Three kinds of measures are presented. The first is the simple average of KL 
ratios in Japanese affiliates. In most of the industries, affiliates in developed countries 
have higher KL ratios than those in East Asian countries. This result implies that 
Japanese MNEs investing in East Asia aim to utilize low-priced labor. Secondly, the 
simple average of KL ratios in Japanese MNEs’ home activities is also presented. 
                                                  
11  Downloadable from the METI web site:   
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/tyo/kaigaizi/index.html. 
12  This table includes the MNEs with multiple-affiliate or/and negative gap values and those without 
exports to their affiliates. 
 10Compared with the results in the first measure, the table does not show clear differences 
in KL ratios between the case of East Asia and that of developed countries, in most of 
the industries. This result would indicate that Japanese MNEs investing in either East 
Asia or developed countries have no choice but to get engaged in sufficiently 
capital-intensive production activities at home due to the high wages in Japan. The last 
is the gap in KL ratios between home and overseas activities. We find that, in almost all 
industries, the gap is larger in the case of East Asian countries. Thus, we can say that, on 
average, Japanese MNEs investing in East Asia cut out production blocks on the basis 
of factor intensities. 
 
4.2. Regression Results 
     Next, we report our regression results. Basic statistics are provided in Table 2.
13 
Table 3 tabulates the regression results.   
 
===   Tables  2-3   === 
 
     The baseline results are presented in equation (I). Three points are noteworthy in 
the case of ROA. First, we can see that the coefficient for Gap is estimated to be 
significantly positive at the five percent level, indicating that the larger the gap in KL 
ratios between MNEs’ home and overseas activities, the higher their profitability. 
Secondly, the insignificant result in capital stock would be because differences in scale 
among MNEs are already adjusted by dividing their consolidated profits by their total 
assets. Thirdly, as is consistent with our theoretical framework, the closer to Japan the 
host country is, that is, the lower the distance-related charge, the significantly better the 
performance. The results in the case of labor productivity are basically the same as in 
the case of ROA. In particular, the coefficient for Gap is again positively significant at 
the one percent level. The noteworthy difference with the case of ROA is that the 
coefficient for the capital stock turns out to be significantly positive. This result may 
indicate that total employment is not enough to control MNEs’ scale embodied by their 
capital stock, in contrast to total assets. 
To confirm the robustness of these results in Gap, we further conduct several 
regressions. First, by introducing country fixed effects or country-year fixed effects, we 
control host country characteristics in full detail, which include factor endowment, 
technology, the magnitude of service link costs, and so on. Then, differences in factor 
                                                  
13 In this dataset, we exclude two obvious outliers in gap: they have abnormally large gaps of a 
value greater than 1,000. 
 11prices, that is, differences in the slope of the unit isocost line, are also controlled. In 
these regressions, host country-specific variables are dropped. Their results are reported 
in equations (II) and (III) and remained unchanged with baseline results. That is, we 
consistently find positive estimators of the Gap coefficient. 
The second robustness check is more important. Since our sample of host 
countries comprises countries with different levels of economic development, there 
seem to be the large differences in labor quality. Although such differences may be 
partly controlled by introducing country-year fixed effects, we also try to adjust such 
differences more directly. Specifically, we multiply an affiliate’s employment by a ratio 
of the level of education (average schooling years in the total population) in the host 
country to that in Japan. The data concerning the education level are drawn from “Data 
Set for a Panel of 138 Countries” provided by Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee.
14 By 
employing such adjusted labor in the host countries, we again calculate our gap measure 
and labor productivity. Their basic statistics are reported in Table 2, and the regression 
results are provided in Table 4. From this table, we again find qualitatively unchanged 
results compared with Table 3 and confirm the significantly positive coefficients for 
Gap. 
 
===   Table  4   === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper empirically investigated gains from fragmentation at the firm level. 
Examining corporate performance on a consolidated basis, we investigated, using 
Japanese firm-level data, whether the heterogeneity in impacts of international 
fragmentation on corporate performance across firms exists or not. We found that the 
larger the gap in KL ratios between their home and overseas activities, the more greatly 
their cost efficiency improves. Several estimations confirmed the robustness of this 
finding. Given this finding, our future research may be to clarify what firm 
characteristics determine such a gap in KL ratios between home and overseas activities. 
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 Table 1. KL Ratios 
Developed East Developed East Developed East Developed East
Countries Asia Countries Asia Countries Asia Countries Asia
Textile 5 110 15 3 48 13 32 11
Chemicals 157 262 30 19 25 27 -5 8
P r i m a r y  m e t a l 2 89 0 1 61 4 2 32 7 6 1 3
Metals 14 42 13 6 10 9 -3 3
General Mach. 134 153 17 4 13 11 -4 7
Electrical Mach. 48 138 11 6 11 10 0 5
IT Mach. 145 298 4 5 11 12 6 7
Trasnport Equip. 187 221 19 9 12 12 -7 3
Precision Mach. 23 43 6 5 9 11 2 6
Others 176 347 20 23 24 22 4 0
Total Average 917 1,704 18 11 17 17 -1 5
KL in affiliates KL at home Gap Observations
 
Source: Authors’ calculation by using the Basic Survey of Overseas Business and Activities 
 
Table 2. Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Return on assets 204 7 14 -18 108
Labor productivity 204 13 19 -23 145
Gap 204 9 16 0 198
log of Capital stock 204 6 2 3 10
log of Distance 204 8 1 7 9
log of Country risk 204 4.06 0.26 3.33 4.42
Adjusted Labor productivity 204 8 16 -4 197
Adjusted Gap 204 13 19 -23 144  
Source: Authors’ calculation by using the Basic Survey of Overseas Business and Activities 
 14Table 3. Baseline Results 
Dependent variable
Equation (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
Gap 0.108** 0.117* 0.121* 0.495*** 0.450*** 0.457***
[0.054] [0.062] [0.063] [0.095] [0.096] [0.100]
log of Capital stock -0.249 -0.376 -0.570 2.379*** 2.632*** 2.619***
[0.748] [0.697] [0.747] [0.613] [0.632] [0.690]
log of Distance -6.414** -4.745
[2.989] [3.175]
log of Country risk -3.127 -1.477
[3.123] [5.167]
Year dum. YES YES NO YES YES NO
Industry dum. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dum. NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country*Year dum. NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.188 0.206 0.250 0.425 0.498 0.505
Return on Assets Labor Productivity
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
 15Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
Dependent variable
Equation (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
Gap 0.113** 0.119* 0.123* 0.545*** 0.500*** 0.509***
[0.055] [0.063] [0.064] [0.093] [0.097] [0.102]
log of Capital stock -0.226 -0.349 -0.539 2.511*** 2.707*** 2.696***
[0.750] [0.698] [0.745] [0.593] [0.620] [0.674]
log of Distance -6.384** -3.882
[2.974] [3.181]
log of Country risk -3.253 -3.326
[3.107] [5.215]
Year dum. YES YES NO YES YES NO
Industry dum. YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country dum. NO YES NO NO YES NO
Country*Year dum. NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.189 0.207 0.251 0.448 0.509 0.517
Return on Assets Labor Productivity
 
Table 4. Regression Results: Adjusted Employments 
  
 16Figure 1. The Fragmentation Theory: Production Blocks and Service Links 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
 17Figure 2. Fragmentation 
 
 
Figure 3. Small KL Gap versus Large KL Gap 
 
 18Figure 4. International Fragmentation with Service Link Costs 
 
 
Figure 5. Small KL Gap versus Large KL Gap: Service Link Costs 
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